Mapping Film Piracy in China
Shujen Wang and Jonathan J.H. Zhu I DENTIFIED AS one of the most prominent media issues of the 'digital millennium' (Valenti, 2000) , global entertainment piracy is a complex issue with important economic, political, cultural and theoretical consequences. In 2002, revenue losses due to copyright piracy totaled $9.21 billion. It has been most severe in Asia where China alone saw a $1.85 billion loss (IIPA, 2003) . This multidimensional and multifaceted issue is inextricably linked to the processes of media globalization.
In this article we will map the scope and dimensions of film piracy (in the form of optical disc piracy) in Mainland China. The fact that film and its ancillary products are not only commodities, they are also forms of national and cultural expression, renders it necessary to critically review the issues at hand from policy and institutional as well as cultural perspectives.
We focus on film (in the form of optical discs such as VCDs and DVDs) piracy partly because of the dominant position Hollywood occupies in shaping the ever-shifting landscape of 'global culture', and partly because of the leading role the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and its international arm the Motion Picture Association (MPA) play, lobbying and influencing not only the making of US trade and foreign policies, but also those of other countries. The research focus also acknowledges the unique weight the Chinese government places on film for ideological, historical and cultural reasons. Such concerns have certainly translated into People's Republic of China (PRC) policies regarding the import of Hollywood films, as well as the discrepancy between theatrical and home video import policies (see later discussions). It has certainly become a sore point in, and a source for, annual trade and diplomatic confrontations between the US and China on copyright and piracy issues.
Having been designated as a 'Special 301 Priority Foreign Country' 1 by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) three times in the past decade (1991, 1994 and 1996) and subsequently subject to potential trade sanctions for its failure to contain copyright piracy and to provide market access to the US copyright industries, 2 China has proved to be one of the most challenging markets for the US copyright industries. 3 With its everenticing billion-plus market 4 and a fast-growing economy, however, China occupies a unique position in the global economy and, consequently, holds considerable negotiation leverage vis-a-vis the US and the international trade regimes.
Meanwhile, the copyright industries in the US are one of the fastestgrowing segments in the national economy, and are the leading economic sector in foreign sales and exports. 5 As mentioned, the annual losses due to piracy are estimated at $9 billion in 1999, $8.1 billion in 2000, $8. 4 billion in 2001 , and $9.21 billion in 2002 (see USTR, 2001 , 2002 . Of these, $2.1 billion in 1999 (23 percent) , $1.08 billion in 2000 (13 percent), $1.5 billion in 2001 (18 percent) and $1.85 billion in 2002 (20 percent) were estimated losses in China alone, the greatest of any single territory. Piracy in China has therefore been viewed as an especially acute problem in this 'information economy', given that what is being traded globally are, increasingly, copyrights to the intangible entertainment and informational goods.
In this article we aim to examine the question of film and optical disc piracy in China in light of current theory regarding globalization (e.g. Deleuze, 1995; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Harvey, 1990 Harvey, , 2000 Sassen, 2001) , the state (e.g. Hsing, 1998; Sassen, 1991 Sassen, , 1998 and power (e.g. Beck, 1994a; Giddens, 1987 Giddens, , 1990 Giddens, , 1991 Giddens, , 1994 . The analysis of piracy in China will focus on cultural/media policy and history (including film distribution systems), technology (the all important hardware-software-content dynamics), market (supply and demand imbalance), networks and power.
Globalization, Technology and the State: Multiple Networks
. . . control societies function with a third generation of machines, with information technology and computers, where the passive danger is noise and the active, piracy and viral contamination. (Deleuze, 1995: 180, emphasis added) From the open sea to cyberspace, from the use of force to digital decryption, piracy has always been around. The difference today is the unprecedented ease, rate and velocity afforded by the extraordinary developments in digital technology. The same digital technology that makes possible instantaneous global financial transactions also provides optical disc and Internet pirates with the ultimate capacity to copy, distribute and profit with exceptional quality, speed and reach. This technological development and the current state of capitalism are inextricably linked. Indeed, Deleuze (1995: 180) views this technological development as being rooted deeply in a 'mutation of capitalism', a capitalism that is no longer concentrative, proprietorial or directed toward production, as capitalism in the 19th century tended to be. It is instead directed towards 'metaproduction' that sells services and buys activities. It tends toward 'informatization' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 9) , information and markets. Furthermore, with the advancement of digital technology, spatial boundaries are rendered ineffective, while speed is increasingly the ultimate determinant for global success. It is precisely this specific global informational economy that provides both the copyright industries and piracy networks with the necessary environment to thrive in and prosper.
The difference between them lies partly in the fact that piracy networks can by-pass those state and international regulations (albeit those promulgated in a general climate of deregulation) that legitimate businesses in most cases would have to abide by. 6 Piracy networks thus move much faster in a less regulated environment and consequently hold certain advantages (most importantly speed) over legitimate businesses. This is not to suggest, however, that piracy networks operate in a code-less or code-free space, as they are governed by different, albeit much more flexible, sets of rules and codes that dictate their complex operations of production and distribution.
That said, however, piracy networks as part of the 'shadow' economy (Nordstrom, 2000) are very much involved with the formal economy. They operate through and around formal institutions such as the state, its regulatory and enforcement capacities, and its sovereignty. In the case of film piracy in China, for instance, one might ask how pirates and their networks figure in the film distribution system and how they are related to local and central political bodies and relations. What are the relations among the various components of pirate networks (e.g. hardware manufacturers, production line distributors, software retailers, etc.) and those between the legitimate and the illegitimate distribution networks? Are power relations more or less stable? When the US government, for example, has to resort to repeated annual threats of trade sanctions to keep designated foreign countries in line with intellectual property rights agreements, which side holds the power and why? Are the offenders necessarily powerless? When local enforcement seems to be the key to curb piracy, and when state intervention in this case seems to be more critical than ever, is the power of the modern state necessarily diminishing as is widely speculated?
These tensions underscore the urgency of the state, and the new configurations of the state in a global economy. They also highlight the operations and complex intersections of multiple networks, each with its unique and shifting sets of relations and configurations: global regimes, the state, regions, MPAA and MPA, production line distributors, hardware manufacturers and retailers, consumers, pirates, among others. The existing theoretical frameworks (e.g. political economy and certain recent writings on globalization), where the focus tends to be on the dichotomy between the center and the periphery, the local and the global, are therefore inadequate for examining the increasingly complex issues of information, technology and the global economies of space and signs. Sassen (1998: 202) , for example, points out some of the problems of the recent literature's focus on the 'national-global duality', that such duality inevitably leads to propositions about the declining significance of the state in relation to global economic actors. It also leads to emphases on, for example, industry outputs, instantaneous transmission capacity, and the inability of the state to regulate those outputs, while ignoring the production process involved and the infrastructure necessary for that capacity. A better framework would then be to view globalization as conceptually reconstituted 'in terms of a transnational geography of centrality with multiple linkages and strategic concentrations of material infrastructure ' (1998: 214, added emphasis) . Globalization can thus be seen not as an inevitable condition, but as specific processes embedded in and dependent on those linkages and the material infrastructure. After all, 'globalization' as 'a noun of becoming' (Frow, 2000: 174, emphasis added) should be treated as such, and as a continual evolving of 'processes' where the planning, intervention, changes and anomalies are taken into account. The dynamic and interconnecting relations between the state and the global, consequently, deserve and require serious examination, since they set up the 'contents' and 'conditions' of the global. As Sassen has pointed out, the two key elements in the formulation of the conditions and contents are 'the degree of economic globalization's embeddedness in the national and the specificity and social thickness of the global', because the global economy is 'something that has to be actively implemented, reproduced, serviced, and financed ' (2000: 217) . It points to the need to do case studies, as every site will have a different configuration of linkages. Film piracy in Mainland China, for example, is the product of a unique set of legal, political, cultural and economic conditions and processes, which are vastly different from those in Hong Kong and Taiwan, even though the three constitute Greater China and the piracy networks that operate in the region are inextricably linked.
To focus on China, then, is not to endorse a reactionary (re)turn to the 'local', one that celebrates an essentialized and fixed locality that is not touched by global flows. It is instead to view globality and locality, as Hardt and Negri (2000: 45) have suggested, as both regimes of identity and difference, and as 'different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows'. In other words, it becomes dubious at best to maintain that one can somehow re-establish local identities that are outside the global flows.
To focus more specifically on film piracy in China, in this case, is an effort to dissect and understand the complex processes and the multiple linkages of the deterritorializing flows of global filmic products and images, as well as the processes by which they are reterritorialized in various loci through distribution and consumption. Film distribution and piracy are what constitute the links and relations of these networks of circulating images, products and capital. They are also the connecting lines that bridge some of the gaps among these otherwise separate entities. To focus on piracy and distribution, then, is to add the middle part to an otherwise dichotomized attention to the macro/global/production and the micro/local/reception aspects. This is also to take the actor network theory (ANT) approach in emphasizing the concepts of the network, of translation and transformation that are very much a part of circulation and transportation (e.g. Latour, 1999; Law, 1999) and, finally, the concept of both human and non-human actors (i.e. their positions in and relations to the networks) and issues of agency. By focusing on translation and transformation, we might be able to see how the links between two loci are made and how they are transformed or deformed in that process (see Latour, 1999; Law, 1999) . By examining actors or 'actants' (Latour, 1999: 18) , both human and non-human, and how they are hooked up with some of these circulating entities (e.g. piracy networks), one might understand how they achieve, and what might have provided them with, their subjectivities, reflexivity, actions and intentionalities.
To use the notion of 'network' to examine issues of globalization, piracy and the state, one emphasizes how the elements in a network are able to retain their spatial integrity 'by virtue of their position in a set of links or relations ' (Law, 1999: 6, original emphasis) , and how regions are constituted by networks. It is out of what he terms 'double dissatisfactions' regarding social scientists' tendency to define a trajectory or a movement by focusing on oppositions between two notions, micro and macro, agency and system (or individual and structure), that Latour (1999: 17) proposes the actor network theory and the concepts of framing and summing up as a way to pay attention to these two dissatisfactions. In this sense the social possesses the property of a 'circulating entity'. The network in ANT then is referred to as the 'summing up of interactions through various kinds of devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae, into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus ' (1999: 17) where no interaction is not framed (1999: 19) . Finally, in revisiting the Actor Network Theory, Latour (1999: 15) further differentiates between the concept of 'network' as used in ANT and the word 'network' now popularized in the world of information technology. The latter means 'transport without deformation', whereas the former designates 'a series of transformations -translations, transductions'.
It is in this framework of the multiple networks that we examine and problematize film piracy in China as circulating and intersecting networks where the foci are transformations, deformations and translations.
Film Piracy in China
China's geographical, technological, economic and political environments as such have made it not only a desirable market for pirated goods, but also an appealing production and export base for makers, distributors and exporters of such merchandise, with wide-ranging implications and consequences. Its threats to the transnational copyright industries are substantial. When viewed from the perspective of being a lucrative market for pirated goods, the consequence of piracy in China takes the form of revenue losses in one single territory. From the perspective of being a production and export base for pirate networks, however, potential losses can be far more immense and damaging.
Although the motion picture industry is not the one that bears the heaviest copyright revenue losses in China (see Table 1 ), it is one of the most visible in anti-piracy actions in China (and in Asia in general). The Motion Picture Association (MPA) works closely with the Chinese customs in investigating, raiding and cracking down on pirate factories and smuggling. Table 2 shows such MPA involvement in 2000. In the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) reports, MPA is the only foreign organization listed as having participated in similar raids and investigations.
In this section we map the film piracy issues in China, with a focus on optical disc piracy (e.g. VCDs and, more recently, DVDs). Film piracy in China is embedded in complex and intersecting settings, both internal and external. These factors have indeed provided the necessary soil for piracy to take root. The mapping then would be situated in these specific spatial-temporal contexts: film import policies, film distribution system, Sino-American relations, technology developments (hardware and software dynamics), market conditions (supply and demand imbalance), copyright regulations and enforcement, and finally spatial organization and networks.
Film Import and Distribution Policies
To understand film piracy, one may start with the political, ideological and cultural significance film holds in Chinese society, as it informs cultural policies which in turn shape the cultural environment in general, and market structure in particular. Film in China is viewed as one of several existing 'cultural markets' 7 and has always been deemed as a product of 'the political, economic, military, and cultural invasions of the West', and thus viewed as carrying with it 'a deep colonial branding' from the very beginning (Liu, 1999: 217, our translation). It has therefore always been the government and the Party's mission to indigenize and nationalize the film industry. After the Communist Revolution in 1949, China started building its own 'independent national film system' and banned American films entirely in 1950. The protection of the film industry thus has a special priority in China's cultural policies. With the establishment of Sino-US relations in 1979, Hollywood sought to re-enter the Chinese market and continued to do so through the 1980s (Zhao and Schiller, 2001 ), but it was not until the release of The Fugitive (Warner Bros) in November 1994 that American films were systematically allowed into China. 8 With this development, however, there still remained an unofficial de facto quota of 10 revenue-sharing foreign films per year, 9 a topic of great significance to which we will return later.
As mentioned earlier, film piracy in China is partly a by-product of the overall foreign film (read: Hollywood majors' productions) import regulation and distribution system. Under the auspices of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), theatrical distribution is a government monopoly operated through China Film Corp. The longpracticed unofficial de facto quota of 10 revenue-sharing 10 films per year became hence the center of much contention between the Hollywood majors Groves, 2001; Schwarzacher, 2001 ), 11 it is still not enough to trigger investment to build screens and restore cinemas. Even with 20 films per year it would still be hard to satisfy the demand from the increasingly savvy Chinese viewers who are well tuned to global entertainment. Furthermore, with the 20 or so films that do pass through the lengthy review/censorship process, the PRC releases are usually months behind their US releases. Home video (including VCDs and DVDs) importation, on the other hand, is controlled through a different channel: the Ministry of Culture. 12 Starting in 1997, China allowed the import of American videos. 13 Even though what is recorded on video is also in film, the medium is considered new (as opposed to the older and more ideologically loaded medium of 'film'), and the procedures and regulations for approving home videos for domestic distribution are faster and more lenient. Between 1997 and 2000, for example, the Ministry of Culture approved the import of over 800 home video titles (averaging 200 titles a year), compared to 10 theatrical releases a year. 14 Although the home video review process is faster than that for theatrical releases, it is still lengthy. When given a choice between renting a legitimate yet dated copy of VCD for RMB $2 to $3 (about US $0.25 to 104 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) The USTR 'Special 301' Episodes In China, the development of a copyright-related legal framework and antipiracy policies is closely related to the market economy reforms and China's insertion into the global economy. As the following discussion will illustrate, the success of bilateral or multilateral copyright agreements still lies in the effectiveness of local implementation and enforcement of these agreements and treaties. The complex process itself inevitably involves much interpretation, translation and maneuverings at various levels. It accentuates the crucial roles the state plays in transnational copyright governance. Thus, while state sovereignty might be eroding in some aspects, new state powers are also being created. Following Deng Xiaoping's Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, the US, along with other western countries, started to pressure China to adopt more protective intellectual property (IP) laws. By the early 1990s China had already become a lucrative market for foreign investments. The pressure for full protection of foreign rights increased (Jayakar, 1997). It is not a coincidence, then, that the USTR placed China on the Priority Watch List in 1989 and 1990 to 'encourage it to commence a law reform process' (1999 'Special 301' Report: PRC: 2; see 'Websites' section in References). Responding to the pressure and realizing the need to conform to international standards to be part of the world economy, China in 1990 incorporated international standards and enacted its Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China. The law however was considered incompatible with the Berne Convention and in 1991 USTR named China a Priority Foreign Country. On 30 September 1992, China's Berne-compatible regulations went into effect and in October 1992, China joined both the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention. The copyright framework in China was by then comparable to that of other countries (Jayakar, 1997) . With a legal framework in place, the copyright industries began to attribute the high level of piracy in China to the lack of enforcement. Before long, more 'aggressive and deterrent enforcement' became the focus of antipiracy campaigns and 'the key to reducing piracy in China' (2000 'Special 301' Report: 26; see 'Websites' section in References).
With the move toward a global information society, the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime has also been increasingly globalized through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Trade Organization and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. While these multilateral organizations, treaties and agreements are comprehensive, and seek to ensure that their membernations provide standardized IPR protections, they rely heavily on state laws to conform to the treaties and agreements to ensure the effectiveness. Concerned transnational copyright holders would still have to work through Wang & Zhu -Film Piracy in China 105 the state on copyright protection issues. Bilateral and unilateral measures such as trade sanctions and retaliations are thus often deployed to improve the IPR protection. The United States, for example, has relied on multilateral approaches for overall legal and regulation guidelines and directions while using bilateral and unilateral means to ensure the proper enforcement on the local level. 'Special 301' is one such measure.
According to 'Special 301', created in 1988 by Congress when it passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 (that amended the Trade Act of 1974), the USTR will identify countries that fail to provide adequate and effective intellectual property rights protection and equitable market access to American businesses. Those that are designated 'Priority Foreign Countries' are the ones with the greatest adverse impact on US products. They are therefore subject to trade sanctions at the end of an ensuing investigation. 'Priority Watch List' and 'Watch List' are two other categories that do not involve immediate trade sanctions. 16 If 'Special 301' can be characterized as a retaliatory measure, then the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program would be a reward system. GSP is another unilateral trade tool that has been used by the US to ensure local enforcement of copyright laws. It provides unilateral, nonreciprocal, preferential duty-free entry for over 4,650 articles from roughly 140 beneficiary countries, which is an important incentive for foreign countries to provide effective IPR protection (among other such conditions to provide market access) to US copyright industries. In the case of China, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status has also been used as an incentive for China to maintain the proper functioning of its copyright regime (see Jayakar, 1997).
As was mentioned earlier, China was designated as the 'Special 301' 'Priority Foreign Country' in 1991 , 1994 Table 3 ). Each time, a threatened trade war was avoided at the last minute after lengthy and frustrating negotiations and mutual threats. After China was named the 'Priority Foreign Country' in 1991, for example, lengthy negotiations ensued, resulting in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property (MOU) in January 1992, two hours before US retaliatory measures were to be implemented (1999 'Special 301' Report: PRC, see 'Websites 106 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) Finally, in 1996 USTR for a third time placed China on the Priority Foreign Country list and issued a retaliation list, comprising over $2 billion worth of products. China then published its own retaliation list, identical to that of the US, subjecting US products to 100 percent tariffs. On 17 June 1996, hours after the deadline, the US and China agreed on a set of announcements and averted yet another threatened trade war. This agreement then subjected China to monitoring of its compliance with the 1995 and 1996 agreements under Section 306 of the US Trade Act. China has remained on the Section 306 Monitoring List ever since. 17 The Chinese anti-piracy efforts to a certain extent coincide with the 'Special 301' agreements and negotiations. Right at the time when the USTR first put China on the Priority Watch List in 1989, China founded the National Anti-Pornography Working Committee. The Committee changed its name to the 'National Anti-Piracy and Pornography Working Committee' (NAPWC) in February 2000. The committee is the leading anti-piracy organization in China with 15 institutional members from major communication, transportation, cultural and informational branches of the government. 18 The NAPWC's 2000 report categorizes China's effort in curbing piracy into four stages: Phase I (1995) saw the establishment of the title verification system: the SID code. 19 Phase II (1996) highlighted assaults on underground optical disc factories. Phase III (1997) focused on curbing smuggling, with the customs playing an indispensable role. And finally Phase IV (1998-present) emphasizes international collaboration and interregional cooperation.
With China's entry into the WTO, it is estimated that there will be slight growth of 5 percent to 15 percent in the legitimate optical disc market. 20 It was also believed that pirates would increase their activities before the formal entry of China into the WTO. 21 Hardware-Software Dynamics The Video Compact Disc (VCD) is a little known quantity in the West, but in the Asia-Pacific region, it is the dominant format for recorded video entertainment. 22 The VHS business has more or less been killed off by piracy, while most of the Asian territories have become disc-based markets (Screen Digest, 2000) .
The VCD development has proved to be one of the most serious and unexpected challenges to the major studios and those transnational makers of electronic hardware that hold, determine, and monopolize video and audio entertainment formats and standards. As the following discussion will Wang & Zhu -Film Piracy in China 107 demonstrate, the unexpected rebirth of the VCD in Asia has not only redrawn the film distribution maps, both legitimate and illegitimate, but also redefined the power relations among various global as well as local players by reversing the flow of global video technology format and standardization. It has indeed become one of the most fascinating cases of a reterritorialized space where the state, local manufacturers, and consumers collude to -in a way -defy and resist globalization and standardization, while transforming and translating a passing, and indeed obsolete, technological development to fit local needs.
Philips and Sony (and later Matsushita and JVC) developed the VCD technology in 1993 to record video on compact discs. It was cheap, digital, convenient, and seemed to be setting the standard. Even from the beginning, however, Philips was well aware of the pending arrival of high-density Digital Videodisc (DVD) and the threat it would bring to VCD. With its greater capacity and a better picture, the DVD standard did replace the VCD three years later. 23 VCD, however, lived on in much of East and SouthEast Asia and became the best-selling format. Its cheaper prices (some are sold for less than US $40, see The Economist, 1999) and the digital quality were reasons why VCD held on, but there is no denying that VCD piracy (i.e. software) had a major influence on the hardware development, and vice versa. According to a report by The Economist (1999), by 1998 China alone had 500 VCD manufacturers. 24 Table 4 Table 5 summarizes the user-rate of VCD players in urban China: 36 percent of urban households now own VCD players. With the continued advance of DVD technology and the lowering of prices, more and more urban households are replacing their VCD players with DVD. The State Information Centre predicted that the VCD players and SVCD players would mainly be sold to the rural areas while DVD would be sold to urban areas.
The developments in hardware and software are significant as they are one of the most important factors in film piracy. There follow some questions pertaining to this intricate issue.
108 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) The Chicken-Egg Question. The developments of VCD hardware (i.e. players) and software (i.e. discs) are closely related. Depending on who one asks, it is hard to say whether pirated VCDs stimulated the increase in production of the players, or vice versa, or whether making such a distinction is even possible since many hardware developers are also involved in software design and manufacture. Some pirates believe that because discs feed the VCD machines, pirated VCDs stimulated the growth of the VCD manufacturing industry. 25 What seems to be a widely held belief is that the VCD manufacturers certainly push for piracy since it helps the growth of the industry. The so-called 'bundle deals' 26 are a widely practiced promotional activity in China, where manufacturers might include as many as 100 free VCDs as a bonus to those customers who purchase a machine. Some of these discs are legitimate; many are not.
Narrow Margin for Authorized Replication Plants and the Problem of Overcapacity.
With the rampant VCD piracy in Asia, one of the strategies deployed by the Hollywood majors is to lower the prices of legitimate VCDs. As a result, however, profit margins for all involved are narrowing (see Screen Digest, 2000) , hence increasing the temptation for authorized replication plants to use spare manufacturing capacity to produce illegal products. Furthermore, with the increasing efficiency of production lines, some of the plants also face problems of over-capacity, resulting in over-production and export of illegitimate products.
DVD Improves the Quality of Pirated VCDs! One of the interesting and, to a certain extent, ironic consequences of the DVD development is that it actually helps raise the quality of pirated VCDs. The best quality of pirated 
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Flexible Trans-border Networks and Flows
Even though this is a study of film piracy in China, it does not suggest that it is possible to isolate the issue and view it solely within China. It would be seriously remiss not to examine the multi-leveled and multi-layered flows that take place intra-and supra-nationally. That pirated goods move at such extraordinary speed and efficiency around the globe is an indication of the network power pirates possess. Piracy in China operates in an inextricably complex market plexus (see Latham, 2000) where multiple networks intersect and interact. In light of earlier discussion of the global flow of goods and of the market plexus, in this section we will examine and problematize issues surrounding the ultra-fluid and flexible piracy networks in and around China.
Above Ground © Underground © Overseas © Back Again. The fluid piracy routes and strategies have reflected a highly sophisticated and flexible spatial organization. Zhang Hui Guang of the NAPWC described it best when she summarized the movements of the piracy actions in and around China: it was first driven from above ground to underground; then from domestic/underground to overseas; and finally from overseas the goods are smuggled back into domestic underground. 29 What these stages and routes demonstrate is precisely the working of flexible piracy networks and their connectedness and resourcefulness. These movements certainly correspond to 'Special 301' actions and the subsequent Chinese anti-piracy offenses summarized earlier.
110 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) After being named a Priority Foreign Country in 1994, the following year marked the first phase of the 'all-out offensive' to contain piracy (NAPWC Report, 2000: 11) . The focus of this phase of action is on regulating the authorized and legal replication plants' aboveground piracy activities. Between 1992 and 1994 there were reportedly 19 replication plants with 40 production lines, 30 with production capacity of 3 million VCDs per year. The aboveground and more or less open piracy activities by legitimate plants were therefore driven underground, which marked the second phase of anti-piracy offensive as well as the peak of underground piracy in 1996. According to the NAPWC, the second phase of offensive had successfully forced the pirates to take their facilities and activities overseas, but only to see finished and high-quality products flowing back into China through various channels. The third phase (1997) then dealt with such smuggling activities from overseas, while the fourth (1998 till present) involves international collaboration.
In the meantime, smuggling is no longer restricted to the coastal provinces. The entry points have expanded to include those of inland provinces. A recent hot spot is along the China-Myanmar (formally Burma) border. Some of the pirated VCDs now enter China through Yungnan province that borders Myanmar (NAPWC Report, 2000) . On 16 May 2000, China seized and destroyed 250,000 VCDs along the Yungnan-Myanmar border, one of the most important VCD smuggling cases in recent months. The discs seized were copies of 75 different films, mostly Hollywood movies and a few Hong Kong ones. 31 Greater China and the Intra-regional Flows. The development of VCD technology and of piracy is closely related to intra-regional activities. Even more crucial are the flows between the Chinese Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, or what is known as Greater China. Hsing (1998) has pointed out that while capital might not be as concerned about national boundaries in the global economy, it is still very much formed by cultural and institutional boundaries. The 'Greater China Economic Circle' that has been the center of much recent scholarly and practical attention is also a 'Greater China Piracy Circle'. The extraordinary fluidity and volume of piracy flows among the three territories are an indication of not just geographical but cultural proximity. A production line distributor who speaks the same language and understands the customs would be able to sell the equipment much more easily than one who does not. A distributor of pirated products would be able to get a better grasp of the local tastes and needs easier than otherwise. The two local conditions in southern China that Hsing (1998: 11) cited as having set the platform for interaction with transnational capital are also true for the operation of pirate networks: (1) southern China's connections with the outside world through Hong Kong, and (2) the existence of a large pool of qualified labor.
Greater China, however, is not the sole area where pirate networks operate. It is common knowledge that the process of piracy involves The emergence of Malaysia as a major player in the East and SouthEast Asian piracy networks in the late 1990s is closely related to activities in Greater China. When Mainland China and Hong Kong were cracking down on pirate productions and the export of optical media products in the mid-to late 1990s, pirates as well as production facilities moved to nearby Malaysia, an attractive destination for both production and distribution of pirated optical discs (see 2001 'Special 301' Report: Malaysia, in Websites section in References). Pirated goods are trafficked to Singapore across the causeway from Malaysia. Through Malaysia's ports, pirated goods are sent out to Asia, Latin America, Europe, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and Canada. 33 Another example of the Malaysia connection is the VCD piracy map presented in Figure 1 of The World Is Not Enough, the James Bond film in 1999. The film had its world premiere in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 19 November 1999. Pirated copies were found in India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Hong Kong within a week, and in China within 10 days.
Profiles
Finally, during one of the authors research trips in China she interviewed a cross-section of people on their consumption of pirated movie VCDs. They make very conscious decisions to consume pirated VCDs and are very clear about how such behavior empowers them. While monetary incentives are certainly a common motivation, there are other different and much more complex reasons behind their decisions. Below a selected few are presented, representing different backgrounds and preferences. For privacy and security reasons, they will remain nameless.
112 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) 
A Group of Graduate and Undergraduate Students in Beijing.
For college students, both undergraduate and graduate, pirated VCDs provided them with a source of affordable film entertainment. On the college campus where one of the authors interviewed some of the students, there is a studentoperated on-line movie and music service with extensive lists of contents. A student committee is put in place to be in charge of the Internet entertainment selections. The extensive film lists include those of US, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland origin. There are also channels featuring documentaries, television series and traditional theatre pieces (e.g. Peking Opera). In the computer lab that one of the authors visited, there was a projector and a screen onto which the Internet movies could be projected. Most popular among this group of students are American and Hong Kong films. The same 2000 list included some of the most recent Hollywood and Hong Kong releases (which indicated that illegitimate copies were used). In addition to these free on-campus services, pirated VCDs for private viewing are a major source for the students' film entertainment. They rarely go to cinemas for movies, as tickets are too expensive. An average student ticket costs RMB $15 (approximately US $2). An average adult ticket costs between RMB $25 and RMB $30 (roughly US $3-4), depending on the film. A ticket for Titanic went as high as RMB $80 (about US $10). When a pirated VCD sells in Beijing for about RMB $10 (about US $1), the choice is obvious.
A College Professor in Beijing.
Professor S is in his late 30s, teaching statistics. For his personal viewing, he prefers American action films. He often bases his decisions of which pirated VCDs to buy on what he reads in the newspaper or on the Internet regarding the latest and hottest Hollywood releases. When one of the authors interviewed him in June and July of 2000, he was searching for MI2 and U571, both new US releases. He found copies for RMB $10 each for both films. He also buys computer and statistics software from the same pirate source. The legitimate SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) program, for example, was selling for RMB $12,000 (approximately US $1,500), but the pirated version costs only RMB $8 (roughly US $1). Likewise with Windows products. An otherwise RMB $1,700 (around US $200) worth of Windows 95 was selling in the pirate market for RMB $8. When he revisited Professor S in November 2001, he had already purchased the pirated version of the new Windows XP. He felt that he had no choice but to resort to the pirated copies. He and his classes simply could not afford to purchase the legitimate version. To him, pirated software is indispensable for the development of national higher education.
An Engineer in Shanghai. Mr L is in his mid-40s and is an upwardly mobile white collar Shanghainese engineer residing in a working-class neighborhood. For his work, he travels to Europe frequently and is therefore quite cosmopolitan. A very reflective and self-conscious person, he sends his 14-year-old daughter to a private English cramming school after hours, hoping she will grow up even more cosmopolitan than himself. He proudly
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told one of the authors that Pudong, a newly developed financial center in Shanghai, east of Huang Pu River, is 'the Manhattan of the East'. Mr L also buys pirated VCDs and he loves American movies. When the writer told him pirated VCDs were selling for RMB $15 each in a neighborhood of Shanghai where foreign businesses congregate, he told her that in his neighborhood they were selling for RMB $5 each. His reasons for buying pirated VCDs instead of renting or going to the cinemas are price, speed and the need to be trendy and on top of the popular. Rentals are simply too slow, while going to the cinema too expensive. He said that, to take his family of three to the cinema, he would have to also take into account the cab fare, snacks and ticket expenses, not to mention having to fight the Shanghainese crowd. To him it was simply not worth it.
A Sojourner Taiwanese Businessman in Shanghai. Mr K is in his late 30s and is a well-to-do Taiwanese businessman in Shanghai. He owns a real estate marketing company and employs 80 employees, both local and those he brought over from Taiwan. He is part of the large foreign business and investor phenomenon in China. He married a Beijing woman and has a son. Together they live in one of the most expensive and trendy neighborhoods in Shanghai where many of the expatriate business people live. His new flat is designed by one of the most famous and sought-after interior designers in China. To him, Taiwan and China have already re-unified. 'Look at me', he said, 'I am the best example.' In his spare time, he watches and collects pirated VCDs. When he was interviewed in summer 2000, he owned (and had already watched several times) the pirated Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon VCD, as the film was first premiered in Asia, months ahead of its US release. Mr K's collection includes films from all three parts of Greater China: the Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan. He also has an impressive collection of arty American and European films. A film major in college, he is much more into collecting films and watching a variety of both commercial and independent arty films. To him, the price of pirated VCDs vis-a-vis that of a cinema ticket is not an issue. It is rather a matter of choice and availability of non-mainstream films. In his neighborhood, pirated VCDs are selling for RMB $15.
A Peasant Couple and Their High-school Son in a Zhejiang Province Village.
Mr and Mrs W are former peasants turned physical laborers. They and their son live in a small and more or less isolated village in coastal Zhejiang province. The village is about a 6-hour train ride from Shanghai. They are in their late 40s with a teenage son who is in high school. Mrs W picks tea for a living and makes around RMB $10 (US $1.25) a day. Mr W makes minimal wages delivering and pulling big rocks for a local cement factory. With Taiwanese relatives ('overseas connections'), they are still better off than many of their fellow villagers. They love watching Taiwanese and Hong Kong television series on VCD. Their son loves popular culture. He watches Hong Kong and American action movies. Mr and Mrs W told one of the authors these Hong Kong and Taiwan VCDs made them feel more connected to the outside world and to their relatives in Taiwan.
A Street Vendor Pirate in Beijing. Mr Z is in his 30s and is part of the 'floating population' (liodong renko) in Beijing. A former peasant from Anhui province in eastern China, Mr Z and his wife and their toddler son share a tiny room in northern Beijing. He makes slightly above RMB $1,000 (around US $120) a month selling pirated VCDs. He sells movies, music and computer software. His major complaint about selling pirated VCDs is the lack of quality contents, especially those of major Hollywood films. Because most of his customers are repeat customers, he has to accommodate their tastes and demands. He also gives them refunds when they happen to purchase a 'cinema version' VCD (those shot with a camcorder in theatres and hence of poorer quality). When asked about the piracy networks and how they operate, he says he only knows the person who delivers the goods to him. According to Mr Z, the police care more about cracking down on pornography than on pirated movies. In case of an arrest, he would be sent home without further punishment. And he would always return to Beijing where his son would have a better opportunity for good education.
Discussion
In this section we will examine some of the theoretical implications. More specifically we will revisit the questions of network, power and the state.
Networks and Boundaries
When viewed in the contexts of networks and relations, film piracy in China represents precisely the intersection and transformation/deformation of various circulating entities. Because of the constantly shifting alliances and connections among pirate networks, and among the state, manufacturers, consumers, and a complex group of other relations, they also represent different topological possibilities (see also Law, 1999) . The circulating nature of capital and digital technologies further accelerate the rate of realignments and changes of the topology.
Because circulation and flows often involve directions, velocities and forces, they result in the redefinition of boundaries (e.g. geographical, social, cultural). They also attest to the dynamic relations among various mechanisms of deterritorialization and disembedding and those of reterritorialization and re-embedding. In the case of film piracy in China, such entities as global IPR treaties and agreements, legitimate and illegitimate border crossings of images and products, international electronic developments and standards, have all gone through various transformations, deformations and changes in their framed interactions with local sets of relations and forces.
China's conforming to global IPR protection agreements and treaties (e.g. the Berne Convention, TRIPS), for example, is an act of translation, but one that involves lengthy, and framed, processes of negotiations,
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confrontations and debates first among various PRC government branches, and then among the PRC government, the global trade regimes and USTR, among others. The end product is a transformed and re-imbedded interpretation of international agreements that is contingent upon various levels and layers of local cultural, economic and political codes and specificities.
The unique popularity and prevalence of VCD players in Asia further attest to important processes of reterritorialization, re-embedding and, most of all, deformation. It is in fact a powerful example of the reversed flow of global electronics production. Philips, Sony and other transnational electronics corporations have been setting and defining the order of international audiovisual technology formats and standards. The VCD phenomenon in Asia is a rare case of defiance and triumph over major global corporations. Pirates and manufacturers, with the indirect blessing of the state and consumers, were able to turn a soon-to-be-obsolete technology to their advantage and meet the local businesses' and consumers' interests, while actively and reflexively defining their position vis-a-vis the global economy. To combat VCD piracy, Hollywood majors had to go back to a technology they had long declared obsolete and produced VCD versions of their films for the Asian markets. Strictly speaking, Asian hardware manufacturing industries did define formats from options controlled by transnational corporations, VCD in Asia still serves as an important example of a reversed flow while defining a new global order according to local needs and interests.
Finally, the windowing strategies (of sequencing films through different exhibition outlets and price differentiation approaches) long practiced by Hollywood, as well as the policing and classification of regional DVD zones by MPAA and DVD Copy Control Association (DVD CCA) to prevent foreign DVD markets from stepping out of line, have proved to be ineffective. 34 Through the aid of digital technology and the operations in a more or less code-less environment, piracy networks are able to undermine and challenge the copyright industries' critical need to command space and control time. Therefore, while Hollywood products are dominant in the global popular cultural landscape, the when, how and exactly what of distribution are clearly out of their control.
Power as Relations
One can say contradictory things about the modern state; on the one hand it is withering away, but on the other it is more urgent than ever. . . . That is how one can sketch and fill out the image of a state that, like a snake, is shedding the skin of its classical tasks and developing a new global 'skin of tasks'. (Beck, 1994a: 38, emphasis added) As mentioned earlier, film piracy in China challenges the way we think about power. It problematizes the loci of power and how they function. From the above discussion, it is also clear that the state still holds significant power in coordinating, negotiating and enforcing codes on the circulating 116 Theory, Culture & Society 20(4) entities. The continuous saga of Sino-American 'Special 301' negotiations, and the resulting state-pirate tug of war, for example, illustrates some of the most fascinating dynamics and dialectics of control, power and sovereignty.
So far the existing literature on state sovereignty vis-a-vis global trade and IPR regimes (e.g. National Research Council, 2000; Ryan, 1998) tends more or less to fall into the framework of what Talcott Parsons critiqued as the 'zero-sum' concept of power. 35 Power in this framework is defined in terms of certain mutually exclusive objectives in that one person or one group possesses power to the extent that a second group or person, over whom the power is wielded, would not be able to seize it. To be part of the global economy, or to submit to global trade regimes, then, a state is viewed as giving up sovereignty and hence control over its regulatory, functional and territorial boundaries.
While it is hard to deny the necessarily hierarchical nature of power (see Giddens, 1977 , in Cassell, 1993 where interests between the power-holders and those subject to that power often clash, power relations are rarely absolute and constant as demonstrated by the Sino-American negotiations and the state-pirate maneuverings. Parsons's own framework of viewing power as a 'non-zero-sum game', and as a 'relation from which both sides may gain', instead provides a more adequate conception of power as a 'circulating medium' generated within the functional subsystems of the society (Giddens, 1977 , in Cassell, 1993 . Power would then have to be viewed in terms of the dynamics of those involved. In this sense power is not absolute, instead it has to be viewed in relations and, indeed, as relations.
Similarly, actor network theory provides a different way of seeing and approaching the world and understanding issues of power. Thinking topologically, therefore, one is able to see the 'material resistance argument ' that Latour (1996: 370) advocates. Strength in this sense comes not from concentration and unity, but rather from 'dissemination, heterogeneity and the careful plaiting of weak ties', and is achieved through 'netting, lacing, weaving, and twisting' of these ties. Such understanding has great implications for issues of power, networks, membership, boundaries, sovereignty, the state, piracy and distribution. In such a framework, then, the constant negotiations between the US and China, and the cat-and-mouse game between pirates and the state, can be more adequately examined. The fact that the US has to rely on repeated threats of coercive sanctions indicates an insecure, shallow and unstable base of power. China's decision not to deter the development of VCD technology could also be read as a resistance to the somewhat hegemonic global optical disc standards and practices (e.g. the DVD zoning practices). Finally, China's entry into WTO and its collaboration with other global regimes or regional alliances are part of its effort to strengthen its power base and negotiation leverage. After all, order is produced by 'assemblage' (Lee and Stenner, 1999: 100), when parties meet and become 'assembled' with others in a manner that increases the power of all concerned and yields a new entity that is more powerful or profitable than is possible for any of the participants acting alone.
The crucial question, then, is whether the institutional order of the capitalist economy and the state have to be treated in zero-sum or 'constantsum' terms, 'assuming that any increase in power in one sphere implies a diminution in the other' (Bromley, 1999: 16) . Given that power can be both competitive and collective (Bromley, 1999) , why could it not be viewed as both a constant-sum/zero-sum phenomenon in some aspects and a positivesum one in others? In the case of both the copyright governance and TRIPS, and the Sino-American negotiations, for example, state power is not only indispensable and instrumental in implementing and enforcing international agreements, but also in reflexively negotiating and maneuvering its positions vis-a-vis transnational regimes and regional and domestic influences while shaping national information policies. Film piracy in China then brings into play complex relations of power and control.
Conclusion
In the previous sections we have mapped the issues of film piracy in China in terms of cultural policies, film distribution and the ensuing market imbalance, Sino-American 'Special 301' negotiations, hardware-software dynamics, and networks and flows. While it touches only the surface of a very complex issue, the above mapping has shed some light on the subject.
Theoretically we have taken a network-and spatial-oriented approach in examining film piracy in China. By emphasizing the circulating, and network-and relations-oriented processes of globalization, we have reframed the issues surrounding film piracy in China in the contexts of technology, power and the state. We argue that, as a result of both the regulatory and theoretical fractures, piracy offers some of the most interesting and intricate insights into matters of control, space and the global economy. The fact that piracy networks operate in and around formal and 'legitimate' copyright industries and institutions further challenges the way we see and theorize the functional and regulatory capacities of the state.
In other words, piracy brings out extremely complex issues of power vis-a-vis the state, Hollywood, transnational regimes, technology and consumers. In one sense, even though piracy has cut into the profit margin of the Hollywood majors, it has also reinforced Hollywood dominance in global image markets by circulating Hollywood products and consequently cultivating and creating an environment and demand for more of these products. Furthermore, while piracy challenges some aspects of the state power (e.g. law enforcement), it helps in others. It has, for example, helped the state machine by stabilizing the labor market via employment of various levels of workers (e.g. in retail, manufacturing and transportation sectors, to name just a few), by contributing to tax revenues through various channels (e.g. hardware and software manufacturing and distribution), and by providing much needed and affordable forms of entertainment and escape to the increasingly anxious public in a society in transition.
In the meantime, while what is traded, desired and consumed is still Hollywood movies, digital technology has offered consumers unprecedented power and autonomy. While Hollywood still determines the content of what is circulated through the global distribution and piracy pipelines, consumers are constantly negotiating and interpreting individual local existence by consciously selecting those products that best suit their interests. Furthermore, with the development of digital technologies and the subsequent reduction in the costs of information services and easier access to content, consumer sovereignty would no doubt increase (see Hoskins et al., 1997) .
Finally, issues of piracy have highlighted the central, indispensable and indeed highly intricate roles the state plays in negotiating on the one hand with international trade regimes and transnational corporations, and on the other with piracy networks. The fact that bilateral and multilateral trade and intellectual property treaties and agreements require national implementation and enforcement has given the state certain leverage. The highly ambiguous and inextricable relations among the state, piracy networks and Hollywood further point to the complex and indeed chaotic nature of the current form of capitalism. The above case study demonstrates precisely the plurality of strategies, maneuverings and manipulations all those involved deploy to acquire and maintain power.
In sum, by focusing specifically on (1) the links and nodes of the networks (e.g. the state in transition, hardware and software manufacturers, state agencies, transnational regimes); (2) the directions, movements and forces of the lines that connect the nodes and points (e.g. the operations of piracy networks; the mapping of routes; the reversal of global flows in the case of VCD); and (3) the re-alignment of spatial organizations and cooperation among various networks and agencies (including those of the state, transnational regimes and corporations, and piracy networks) we have intended to re-conceptualize the loci of power, and how processes and mechanisms of reterritorialization have not only redefined boundaries, but also transformed, deformed and even reversed the global flow of products, images and ideas.
Notes
